We consider a game-theoretic model of a regressive profit tax related to profitability. A schedule of an optimal effective tax rate is found.
Introduction
A regressive profit tax related to profitability could be used as a governmental motivation tool for a production effectiveness growth. This paper describes a way to construct a regressive profit tax schedule with a variation model of a choice under uncertainty, where a profit distribution function used as an uncertainty factor. This model is analyzed using both a game-theoretic approach and the Niehans-Savage criterion [6, 7] . It is shown that both approaches produce the same optimal tax schedule. Explicit form of the schedule is provided.
Suppose P is a company profit for an accounting period, C is a cost of all sold products for the same period, and x = P/C is product profitability of this company. Let the absolutely continuous function y = y(x) ∈ (0, 1), x > 0 be an effective tax rate schedule for the company profit related to a profitability. Since P = xC, it follows that
is a value of a company profit tax. A schedule y = y(x) is a regressive schedule on the interval (x − , x + ), 0 < x − < x + < 0 if y = y(x) decreases within this interval, i.e.
almost everywhere within (x − , x + ).
A regressive schedule y = y(x) is a regular regressive schedule on the inter-
almost everywhere within (x − , x + ). Therefore, we have
for almost all x ∈ (x − , x + ) (here y = y(x), y = y (x)).
Combining (2) and (4) we obtain
Thus any regular regressive on the interval (x − , x + ) profit tax schedule can be described by this differential inequalities.
The formulas (1)- (3) give us the following economical meaning for a regular regressive schedule. If a company does not decrease C, then the value of the discharged tax T will increase together with profitability x regardless a tax rate decrease.
Notice, that using (5) and assuming x > 0, y > 0, we get
These inequalities define elasticity restrictions for a regular regressive tax schedule. It is readily seen that if the elasticity tends to zero, then the motivating effect of the schedule also decreases to zero. Thus we suppose that there is an interval [δ, σ] ⊂ (−1, 0) of elasticity values where the motivating effect of the schedule is balanced with the fiscal effect. Finally, we get
for the elasticity restrictions, where δ and σ are external parameters such that
2 The Model
Let us describe the way to produce the effective tax schedules of this kind:
where 0 < x − < x + , 0 < y + < y − and where y * (x) is a solution of a differential inclusion (6) on the segment [x − , x + ] satisfying the following boundary conditions
y(x + ) = y + .
To find a regular regressive schedule (8) with given x − , x + , y − , y + , δ and σ we have to find an absolutely continuous solution of (6), which satisfies boundary conditions (9)-(10). It is easy to see that the solution exists if and only if
where
for the region x > 0, y > 0 with the initial condition (9), and y σ (x) = y σ (x, x − , y − ) is a solution of the differential equation
for the same region and initial condition. Transforming (12) and (13) into an explicit form, we obtain linear homogenous first-order differential equations.
Integrating (12)- (13) with an initial condition (9), we obtain the explicit form of (11):
Hereafter we suppose these conditions are satisfied. Let Y = Y (x − , x + , y − , y + , δ, σ) be a set of all absolutely continuous solutions of a boundary value problem (6), (9), (10). Consider the problem
where f (·) is a profit distribution function, as a way to determine an unique solution of a boundary value problem (6), (9), (10). Here S stands for the total discharged tax for the schedule y(·) : y = y(x) for all companies with profitability x ∈ (x − , x + ). It is obvious that f depends on the taxation environment, particularly on the factual tax schedule. However it is not clear how to determine this dependency. Hence we consider f ∈ F as an uncertainty factor, where F is a set of all admissible profit distribution functions. Thus, (15) is a case of a choice under uncertainty denoted by U = Y, F, S . Hereafter we show that the specific form of F is not important.
The Model Analysis
There are several approaches to solve problems on choice under uncertainty. Let us discuss two of them. As the first approach, we consider U as a game with nature [3] . As the second one we find a solution using the Niehans-Savage criterion [6, 7] .
Let us recall some basic concepts. By γ = A, B, K we denote a two player non zero-sum game, where A and B are the first and the second player's strategy set respectively and K is the payoff function. Any pair of strategies (a, b) ∈ A × B will be considered as a strategy profile in the game γ.
Definition 3.1. Let us take an ε > 0. A strategy profile (a ε , b ε ) ∈ A × B is called an ε-equilibrium in the game γ = A, B, K and strategies a ε and b ε are called ε-optimal strategies of the 1st and the 2nd player respectively, if ∀a ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B,
Furthermore, we generalize the classic definition [4] of an optimal strategy. Definition 3.2. A strategy a 0 ∈ A (b 0 ∈ B) in the game γ = A, B, K is called the 1st (2nd) player's optimal strategy if ∀ε > 0 this strategy is ε-optimal.
Thus as opposed to the classic definition, a player can have an optimal strategy even if ∀ε > 0 another player has only an ε-optimal strategy.
is set to be a dominating strategy of the 1st (2nd) player in the game γ = A, B, K , if ∀a ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B,
It is clear that the dominating strategy is the most preferable for a player but this strategy may not be an optimal strategy. Obviously, the strategy a * = 1 is the 1st player's dominating strategy in this game. Since ∀a ∈ A K(a, b) is a lower unbounded function on the set B, we see that ∀ε > 0, (a ε , b ε ) ∈ A × B the right inequality from (16) can not be true for any b ∈ B. This means that ∀ε > 0 there is no ε-equilibrium nor optimal strategies for any player in the game γ.
Lemma 3.5. Consider the game γ = A, B, K . If there is the dominating strategy a * ∈ A for the 1st player and K is lower bonded on {a * } × B then for any ε > 0 there is an ε-equilibrium and a * is an optimal strategy.
Proof. Let us take an arbitrary ε > 0. Since K is lower bounded on {a * } × B, we see that there is b ε ∈ B such that
Therefore we have
Since a * is a dominating strategy for the 1st player, we see that
From the two above inequalities it follows that (a * , b ε ) is an ε-equilibrium; hence a * ∈ A is an ε-optimal strategy for the 1st player. Since ε > 0 is arbitrary chosen, we see that a * is an optimal strategy. Similar proposition is also true for the 2nd player. Definition 3.6. A strategy a * ∈ A of the game γ = A, B, K is called a Niehans-Savage optimal strategy if
Lemma 3.7. Let a * ∈ A be the 1st player dominating strategy in the game γ = A, B, K ; then a * is the Niehans-Savage optimal strategy.
Proof. It is clear that
By Definition 3.3,
Finally, (17) follows from (18) and (19).
Consider U = Y, F, S as a game with nature, where Y is the first (government) player's strategy set, F is the second (nature) player's strategy set, S is the payoff function. 
then the strategy y
is the 1st player dominating strategy.
Proof. It can be easily checked that the function
is a solution of the equation (13) with the initial condition (9),
is a solution of the equation (12) with the initial condition (10) and the point x 0 from (22) is a the only root of the equation y
It is easy to prove that using (22), we get x − < x 0 < x + . Thus y * (·) is a piecewise smooth solution of the boundary value problem (6), (9), (10).
Let us take some arbitrary y(·) ∈ Y = Y (x − , x + , y − , y + , δ, σ) and f (·) ∈ F . We shall prove that
It is true if
Since y(·) is an absolutely continuous solution of a boundary value problem (6), (9) , (10), it follows that there is a Lebesgue measurable function u(·) such that
and y(·) is a solution of the differential equation
with boundary conditions (9)-(10). Therefore
and
At the same time
Since ∀x ∈ [x − , x + ] : δ ≤ u(x) ≤ σ, we get (23) using (25) and (27), and get (24) using (26) and (28).
Notice that
Thereafter taking into account Lemma 3.5, 3.7 and Theorem 3.8 we obtain the next corollary. It is easily shown that if we substitute equality for one of the inequalities (20); then there will be the only one solution for boundary value problem (6), (9), (10) and the problem (15) will become degenerate. Thus this case has no interest.
Conclusion
The contemporary optimal taxation theory is substantially developed from the J. Mirrlees' research. In contrast to [5] the described model considered as a choice under uncertainty not as an optimization problem. However the model produces a wide class of nonlinear (herein regressive) tax schedules.
Similar game-theoretic models for taxes other than a profit tax were also considered in [2, 9] . Nevertheless this paper provides more comprehensive substantiation of schedule optimality.
Niehans-Savage criterion for optimal control under uncertainty problems was considered by D. Serkov in [8] .
An application of the regressive profit tax schedule is bound to the choice of parameters (21), (22) problem. A solution of this problem could be found following [1] .
Finally let us note that a marginal tax schedule could be constructed from an effective tax schedule (21), (22) following [2] .
